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SOX AND WHISTLEBLOWING
Terry Morehead Dworkin*
The language of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX") leaves no doubt that
Congress intended whistleblowing to be an integral part of its enforcement
mechanisms. The Act attempts to encourage and protect whistleblowers in
a variety of ways, including providing for anonymous whistleblowing, es-
tablishing criminal penalties for retaliation against whistleblowers, and
clearly defining whistleblowing channels. Unfortunately, these provisions
give the illusion of protection for whistleblowers without effectively provid-
ing it. There is increasing evidence that virtually no whistleblower who has
suffered retaliation and pursued remedies under SOX has been successful.
Additionally, social science research and studies of whistleblowing laws
indicate that SOX is unlikely to increase reports.
This Article compares the SOX whistleblowing provisions with other
state and federal whistleblowing statutes, discusses the shortcomings of the
SOX provisions, and explains why SOX needs to be revised in order to help
ensure the integrity of the markets. Recommended revisions include signifi-
cantly rewarding whistleblowers that come forward with novel and relevant
information. Experience with the False Claims Act and equivalent state stat-
utes show such incentive legislation to be the only truly effective legislative
model. The Article goes on to discuss various ways to create an incentive
reward fund. While some of the current law as well as some of the suggested
revisions potentially put SOX in conflict with privacy and whistleblowing
laws of European countries, the conflicts can be eliminated through judi-
cious use of exemptions and/or through judicial interpretation.
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INTRODUCTION
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX")' represents a reification by
the Unites States Congress of the importance of whistleblowing in the con-
trol, detection, and deterrence of wrongdoing. It followed the dramatic
growth of whistleblowing laws in the 1980s and 1990s, 2 along with a grow-
ing hostility and distrust of big business and government. However, it was
the wrongdoing, scandals, and resultant publicity, and the anger brought on
by the leaders of failed corporations such as Enron and WorldCom that were
the particular impetus for the law.3 Whistleblowers were important in bring-
ing the wrongdoing to light4 and in testifying before Congress in hearings
about the law.' Today they play a crucial role in SOX enforcement.
SOX has been controversial since its enactment6 and has been chal-
lenged on a variety of grounds including charges that it is unconstitutional7
and too costly, especially for small business8 and foreign companies.9 It has
also been blamed in part for reduced foreign listings on the New York Stock
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C).
2. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistle-
blower Protection, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 99, 99-115 (2000) [hereinafter Callahan & Dworkin, State
Whistleblower Protection].
3. See, e.g., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (2002), available at http://fll.findlaw.con
news.findlaw.comhdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport020102.pdf; Lawrence A. Cunningham, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV.
915, 924-25 (2003). Other companies that collapsed relatively soon thereafter as a result of corpo-
rate wrongdoing include Global Crossing, Tyco, and Adelphia. Id.
4. Michael Orey, WorldCom-Inspired 'Whistleblower' Law Has Weaknesses, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 1, 2002, at B 1. Indeed, of the three female whistleblowers named "People of the Year" by lime
Magazine in 2002, two, Sherron Watkins and Cynthia Cooper, blew the whistle on Enron and
WorldCom, respectively. Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 30,
2002, at 30.
5. See S. REP. No. 107-146, at 5 (2002). See also JOHN T. BOSTELMAN, I THE SARBANES-
OXLEY DESKBOOK 2-30 (Rel. 8 2005).
6. SOX has been described as having "garbage provisions" that are like "military strate-
gist[s] fighting the last war rather than planning for the next." Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond
Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistle-
blowers 3-4, n.21 (2006) (quoting See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy
Rhetoric, Light Reform (and it just might work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 918-19 (2003)) (article on
file with author).
7. Lawsuit Challenges Enactment of SOXA, Creation of PCAOB as Unconstitutional, 74
U.S. L. WK. (BNA) 2487 (Feb. 21, 2006).
8. See, e.g., Heather Brewer, Snap Judgments, Bus. L. TODAY, May-June, 2006, at 6, 7;
Support Mounts For 'Rolling Back' Sarbanes-Oxley 404 For Smallest Public Companies, As Nasdaq
CEO Adds Public Support, FINANCIALWIRE, Mar. 7, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 3787209.
9. E.g., Alan Murray, Panel's Mission: Easing Capital-Market Rules, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12,
2006, at A2. The article points out that nine of the ten biggest initial public offerings in 2006 were
done overseas. Many experts, it states, believe this reflects the legislative, legal, and regulatory
burdens that public companies do not face when selling stock overseas. "European companies are
... likely to cite the burdens of [regulations which] require[] them to spend millions of dollars on a
detailed intemal-control report." Id.
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Exchange.'0 In response to these and other complaints, many commentators
and legislators have proposed amendments to SOX." In addition, because
SOX is relatively new and litigation is evolving, there are still many unan-
swered questions about its effectiveness, scope, and application that create
something of a moving target for reformers.12 One important question is
whether SOX will be effective in getting observers of wrongdoing to report
it. Another is whether the whistleblower enforcement mechanisms will run
afoul of laws in other countries.
The first Part of this Article contains a comparative discussion of
whistleblowing under the provisions of SOX. The following Part discusses
why, from a social science research and practical perspective SOX is not
proving effective in protecting whistleblowers. The third Part analyzes the
likely ineffectiveness of SOX to spur whistleblowing and the incentive
legislation that would better achieve this. The fourth Part discusses the
extraterritorial reach of the whistleblowing sections of SOX and proposals
for exemptions. The final Part proposes reforms of the whistleblowing
sections to better achieve the intended goals of SOX.
I. WHISTLEBLOWING UNDER SOX
A. Comparative Coverage
There are three whistleblower sections to SOX. The most important,
Section 806, states that a covered company cannot "discharge, demote,
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate" against a
whistleblower who reports covered information to someone within the
organization who "has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate
10. Harvey Pitt, Sarbanes-Oxley is an unhealthy export, FIN. TIMES (London), June 21, 2006,
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/232bdc7a-OOc3-1 ldb-8078-0000779e2340.html (last visited
Jan. 31, 2007) ("Congress's exportation of Sox's standards has created huge difficulties for multina-
tional companies and produced scorn for US standards. This embodiment of American geocentrism
has resulted in a loss of foreign listings on US exchanges and diversion of initial public offerings to
non-US locales."); Alistair Osborne, The post-Enron protection risks penalising everybody, THE
DAILY TEL. (LoNDoN), May 26, 2006, at City 2 ("[SOX] rules have raised the cost of doing business
in New York so much, it is in danger of losing its status as the world's foremost financial market.
Money is fleeing to Europe and London in particular.....).
In an international survey of members of boards of directors, a majority felt that SOX rendered
boards of directors overly cautious and made it more difficult to get people to serve as directors. The
survey, conducted by Kom/Ferry, included responses of nearly 1200 board members from fifteen
nations. PRNewswire.com, Majority of Board Directors Feel Sarbanes-Oxley Regulations Should be
Repealed or Overhauled, http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT= 109&STORY=/
www/story/02-23-2006/0004287861 &EDATE= (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).
11. Murray, supra note 9 (discussing how the newly-formed Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation, in coordination with Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, is attempting to provide politi-
cal cover for "difficult legislative and regulatory changes"). The Commission includes the CEOs of
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, Office Depot, and DuPont, among others.
12. Another factor in the move to reform SOX was the anticipated retirement of Sarbanes
and Oxley, who were anticipated to retire in 2007, and the resultant change in the leadership of
committees that regulate Wall Street, banks and finance. Brody Mullins, Capitol's New Bank Exam-
iners, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2006, at A4.
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misconduct."' 3 In specifying to whom the whistleblowing report should be
made, SOX is like most of the U.S. state and federal whistleblowing statutes. 
4
It also comports with the commonly understood definition of whistle-
blowing as "the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of
illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their
employers to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action."'5
Additionally, like virtually every whistleblower statute, domestic or foreign,
whistleblowers are not required to be correct in order to be protected.16 They
must merely reasonably believe that the information concerns a covered
violation. 17
Section 806 is unusual in specifying internal whistleblowing as an ap-
propriate channel. Most state and federal statutes designate only an external
recipient."s In this regard, SOX follows common whistleblower practice
since internal reporting is the most common type of initial whistleblowing.' 9
Benefits of internal whistleblowing include facilitating the prompt investiga-
tion and correction of wrongful conduct and minimizing the organizational
costs of whistleblowing by permitting employers to rectify misconduct con-
fidentially, with little disruption to the employer-employee relationship.
Internal whistleblowing also enables the correction of misunderstanding,
which reduces the likelihood that the organization and its employees will
unfairly suffer harm. However, it may also allow for cover-ups, as happened
in some of the recent scandals.
Another distinctive section of SOX is the requirement of a channel for
anonymous whistleblowing. This provision is unique among whistleblower
statutes .2  Section 301 of SOX requires audit committees of covered compa-
nies to establish whistleblowing procedures whereby employees can
13. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. II 2002). In addition,
the section specifically protects those who cooperate in a legal investigation or a Congressional
investigation. Id.
14. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the Whistle to the
Media and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM. Bus. L.J. 151,
153-58 (1994) [hereinafter Callahan & Dworkin, Media Whistleblowers].
15. MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE 15 (1992). This definition
is broader than the definition of protected disclosure in most laws because they generally don't
encompass ethics or "immoral" violations. The most common definition is a violation of a law, rule,
or regulation. See id. at 260-273 tbl.6-2.
16. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K., and U.S. Ap-
proaches to Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 879, 898-99 (2004).
17. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(l) (Supp. I 2002). If the
complaint is deemed frivolous, the judge can order up to $1,000 in reasonable attorneys' fees. Pro-
cedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1980.109(b)(2004).
18. Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protect-
ing the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 267, 276-79
(1991).
19. Id. at 301; Marcia Parmerlee Miceli & Janet P. Near, The Relationships Among Beliefs,
Organizational Position, and Whistle-Blowing Status: A Discriminant Analysis, 27 ACAD. OF MGMT.
J. 687, 701 (1984) [hereinafter Miceli & Near, A Discriminant Analysis].
20. Media whistleblowing is the usual anonymous route. However, no statute authorizes this
practice. See Callahan & Dworkin, Media Whistleblowers, supra note 14, at 157.
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anonymously submit issues of concern regarding questionable accounting or
auditing matters.2' Further, it requires the committees to have procedures for
retaining and treating the reports. Most commonly, the organizational re-
sponse to this requirement has been to contract with an independent hotline
company to receive the reports.
2
A person who reports the suspected fraud externally must give the in-
formation to a federal regulatory or law enforcement agency, or to any
member or committee of Congress in order to be protected. As in virtually
all whistleblowing statutes, 3 SOX does not protect whistleblowers who go
to the media.2 4 While studies of media whistleblowers indicate that these
whistleblowers are as responsible as other whistleblowers and have good
reasons to resort to the media, domestic and foreign legislators seem not to
25
trust them or to encourage this kind of reporting.
B. Retaliation
If the whistleblower suffers retaliation for reporting, § 806(a) gives the
employee the right to bring a civil suit. Before that can happen, the em-
ployee must first file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, who then
refers it to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration for investiga-
tion. An administrative law judge of the Department of Labor hears the
evidence resulting from the investigation and renders a decision.26 The case
will not go forward if the employer can show by clear and convincing evi-
dence that it would have taken the action in the absence of the
whistleblowing.27 Congress established a time limit of 180 days within
which the Secretary of Labor should render a decision based on this proc-
28
ess.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4) (Supp. II 2002). According to the Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners, employee tips "are the single most effective means of detecting fraud." Archie B. Carroll,
Carroll: Fighting workplace fraud is huge daily problem, OnlineAthens.com, (June 21, 2003),
http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/062203/bus.20030622014.shtml (last visited Jan. 29, 2007).
22. Jennifer Bjorhus, Hot Lines Hot: Watchdog law has companies scrambling to line up off-
site services to record anonymous employee comments, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 12, 2004, at
DI. Hotlines are discussed in further detail below. One example of a hotline company is Manage-
ment Communication Systems. It reports it runs the "In Touch" hotline system for about 150
companies worldwide. Other major firms are The Network Inc., EthicsPoint Inc., and National
Hotline Services Inc. Since these companies are private, it is difficult to get an estimate of their sales
numbers. Id.
23. Callahan & Dworkin, Media Whistleblowers, supra note 14, at 157.
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. 1 2002).
25. Callahan et al., supra note 16, at 893-95.
26. The decision can be appealed to the Administrative Review Board of the Department of
Labor.
27. Sarbanes-Oxley § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A; 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii)(2000). The
plaintiff must show that his or her whistleblowing actions were a contributing factor in the unfavor-
able personnel decision. See, for example, Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d
1365, 1378-79 (N.D. Ga. 2004) and Murray v. TXU Corp., 279 F. Supp. 2d 799 (N.D. Tex. 2003)
for interpretations of this section.
28. Sarbanes-Oxley § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
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If there is no decision in 180 days, then the employee may bring a civil
suit for de novo review in the district court.29 This creates the potential for
conflicting decisions and duplicative litigation because the whistleblower
can file a lawsuit in the district court while the administrative proceeding is
still pending. 0 At least one court distinguished between this theoretical con-
cern and the case before it because under the circumstances of the current
case it did not lead to "an absurd result.' 3 This was particularly true because
the district courts can conduct a de novo review."
SOX, in defining retaliation as encompassing discharging, demoting,
suspending, threatening, harassing, "or in any other manner discrimi-
nat[ing]" against the whistleblower, statutorily encompasses a broader
definition of prohibited retaliation than most state whistleblower laws."
The definition of covered employees is similarly broad. It includes cur-
rent and former employees and applicants.3 Most whistleblower statutes do
not cover applicants.3 5 The coverage applies not only to publicly traded
36
companies but also to contractors, subcontractors and agents of those com-
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(I)(B).
30. DOL regulations recognized this conflict and further stated:
The Act might even be interpreted to allow a complainant to bring an action in Federal court
after receiving a final decision from the Board .... The Secretary believes that it would be a
waste of the resources of the parties, the Department, and the courts for complainants to pursue
duplicative litigation.
68 Fed. Reg. § 31860, 31863 (May 28, 2003).
31. Hanna v. WCI Communities, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2004). The
court examined whether it could ignore the plain meaning of the statutory language and stated this
should be done only if the language is ambiguous, there is clear evidence of contrary legislative
intent, or it would lead to an absurd result. The first two did not apply and it used the absurd result
standard. The court presumed that Congress passed the statute as a spur to the DOL to give timely
relief to SOX plaintiffs. It found no reason to penalize the plaintiff for what may be an unrealistic
timetable imposed by Congress. The resolution lies with Congress. Id. In addition to his SOX
claims, plaintiff also filed suit under Florida's whistleblower statute.
32. Id. The court went on to reject the argument that plaintiff had to exhaust his administra-
tive remedies before he could file suit in district court and the argument of collateral estoppel. Id. at
1330-31. In Bechtel v. Competitive Technologies, Inc., 448 F3d 469, 474 (2nd Cir. 2006), the court
noted:
Given these successive levels of review, the absence of federal judicial power to enforce pre-
liminary orders reasonably could serve to ensure that appeals work their way through the
administrative system before the federal courts become involved. Moreover, if the result
changes from one level of review to the next, immediate enforcement at each level could cause
a rapid sequence of reinstatement and discharge and a generally ridiculous state of affairs.
33. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 15, at 243-50; see also Section 806, titled "Protection
for Employees of Publicly traded Companies Who Provide Evidence of Fraud," codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1514(a) and Willis v. Vie Financial Group, Inc., No Civ. A. 04-435, 2004 WL 1774575
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2004) (significant changes in job responsibilities are covered retaliation).
34. This includes someone applying to the company or company representative. Company
representative includes any officer, employee, contractor or subcontractor, or agent of a company. 29
C.F.R. § 1980.101 (2004).
35. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 15, at tbls.6-1 & 6-2.
36. The statute states that this includes any company that registers its securities or must file
reports under the Securities Exchange Act. See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.101.
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panies.3" This means, for example, that if an accountant for Arthur Anderson
suffered retaliation for reporting fraud at Enron (as was alleged), the ac-
countant could file a SOX complaint. The law is sufficiently vague that it
may also cover U.S. citizens working for a foreign-listed publicly traded
company overseas or for a private foreign subsidiary of a covered U.S. com-
pany, or a foreign employee working for a foreign subsidiary. 8 If this is the
case, SOX may run afoul of European privacy law and the whistleblowing
statutes of other countries.
The effectiveness of the protection offered by Section 806 is tempered
by the very short statute of limitations of ninety days after a retaliatory ac-
tion occurs.39 Most potential claimants don't realize what their rights are and
how to pursue them in such a short period.40 Additionally, the remedies pro-
vided are more limited than may at first appear.
The statutory language says that a successful claimant "shall be entitled
to all relief necessary to make the employee whole."4 ' But it then goes on to
limit recovery to equitable compensatory damages.42 Earlier studies of whis-
tleblower statutes show that if an employee could not recover punitive and
emotional injury damages, the statutes did not spur whistleblowing nor did
they adequately compensate the employee for the risks taken in reporting
suspected wrongdoing.43
The provision for criminal penalties for knowing and intentional
retaliation that was implemented in SOX is a significant departure from
most whistleblowing laws. Section 1107 imposes penalties on companies
37. Id.
38. In Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 04-10031-RWZ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17205 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2004), aff'd, 433 E3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006), the court held that SOX did not
cover an Argentinean citizen working for a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. parent corporation. A few
administrative law judges have followed this precedent.
39. Sarbanes-Oxley § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. The original bill had a 180-day limitation
period, but it was changed to ninety days through an amendment from Senators Grassley and Leahy.
See Beverly Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection under Sarbanes
Oxley: A Proposal for Change 6 (2006) (on file with author).
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (2002). See also Hanna v. WCI Communities, Inc., 348
F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2004); Willis, 2004 WL 1774575 (plaintiff failed to file his com-
plaint regarding a threatened termination within the ninety-day period and failed to amend his
complaint to include his later firing, and therefore could not seek a remedy).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1).
42. Listed damages include reinstatement with the same seniority, back pay with interest,
and compensation for any special damages resulting from the discrimination including litigation
costs, expert witness fees and reasonable attorney fees. Id. § 1514A(c)(2).
43. EARLE & MADEK, supra note 39, at 13 (arguing that reporting may be harmful to an
employee's future and that the area covered by SOX is difficult for employees to understand com-
pared to sexual harassment or labor issues); Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near,
Whistleblower Statutes and Reality: Is There a Need for Realignment? (1990) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Dworkin & Near, Whistleblower Statutes and Reality]; see also James Fanto, Whistle-
blowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 440
(2004) ("The whistleblowers, who have the company's interests most at heart, are rarely forgiven
•.. and they spend their lives in misery, shunned by employers. For example, Watkins's revelation
of fraud in Enron led the company initially to consider, with advice of outside counsel ... whether
and how to fire her.").
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or individuals that knowingly and intentionally retaliate against a
whistleblower who gives truthful information about any federal offense to a
law enforcement officer."4 While criminal penalties are not unprecedented-
a few U.S.45 and Australian states,"6 for example, impose criminal penalties
for retaliation against whistleblowers-SOX's criminal penalties are unique
in federal whistleblower legislation. If convicted, the intentional retaliator is
subject to a fine and/or imprisonment for up to ten years. Congress,
however, set a high bar for imposing these penalties: the whistleblower must
be correct and there must be a showing of intent.
Section 1107 is also broadly written. It covers retaliation against whis-
tleblowers that provide information to a law enforcement officer about any
federal offense. There is great potential for a broad application to whistle-
blowing about non-securities issues. Also, this section applies to any
company, including nonprofits, and individuals within an organization. It
could also apply to non-organization members. 7 Finally, Section 1107 de-
fines retaliation as taking "any action harmful to any person, includin
interference with the lawful employment or livelihood of any person ....
In terms of whistleblowing, this section has the potential to become the most
important of all the SOX provisions because it could develop into a general
whistleblower protection statute. 9
II. THE INADEQUACIES OF SOX WHISTLEBLOWING
A. Inadequate Protection for Whistleblowers
Despite the intended promotion and use of whistleblowing to help en-
force Sarbanes-Oxley and deter wrongdoing in the securities market, the
statutory scheme gives the illusion of protection without truly meaningful
opportunities or remedies for achieving it."
This ineffectiveness is borne out by statistics regarding cases brought so
far. In a study conducted by Professors Earle and Madek, they report that
through May 2006, of the 677 completed Sarbanes-Oxley complaints, 499
44. The statutory language is: "knowingly, with intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful
to any person...... 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2002).
45. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 15, at 260-73.
46. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act 2001, Act No. 36/2001, 2 Vict. Acts 36, § 18;
Protected Disclosures Act 1994, No. 92, § 20(l)-(IA) (N.S.W. CONSOL. ACTs), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol-act/pdal994251/s20.html; Public Interest Disclosure
Act 1994, No. 108, § 25 (AUSTL. CAP. TERR. LAWS).
47. The language states retaliation against "any person." See supra note 44.
48. Id.
49. Cf In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (hold-
ing that based on the public policy behind SOX, employee silence agreements required by the
employer could not be used to prevent employees from voluntarily reporting or discussing wrongdo-
ing).
50. See, e.g., Murray v. TXU Corp., 279 F Supp. 2d 799 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
51. See EARLE & MADEK, supra note 39, at 20-38, for a discussion of illustrative cases.
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were dismissed and 95 were withdrawn. This demonstrates that, at the least,
success at this level is an uphill battle. Of the cases that went to an admin-
istrative law judge ("AL"), only 6 (two percent) of the 286 resulted in a
decision for the employee.53 Some of the reasons for this lack of success
have already been mentioned: the procedural complexity in bringing a
claim, the very short statute of limitations, and the inadequacy of remedies,
considering the risk and time it takes to negotiate a claim to conclusion.
An example of these problems is shown by the well-publicized case of
Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp.4 Welch, the chief financial officer of
Cardinal Bankshares, refused to certify the organization's financial state-
ments because of company auditing practices and possible insider trading.
He notified the CEO and the auditor about his concerns. He was fired in
October 2002. Welch filed a claim with the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("OSHA"); the hearing officer found that the company had
cause to fire him. Welch appealed that decision to the ALJ, who held in
January 2004 that Welch had shown that he was fired because he had com-
plied with his duty to disclose information, and he ordered Welch
reinstated.55
The ALJ decision regarding Welch was appealed to the Administrative
Review Board ("ARB"), which dismissed it. In February 2005, the OSHA
AU then issued a Supplemental Recommended Decision and Order. The
company had argued that Welch would have been fired anyway because of
the enmity and distrust between Welch and the other employees, and be-
cause he was unfit. Further, it argued the remedy was inappropriate because
another employee would have to be fired to reemploy Welch. These argu-
ments were rejected and the judge ordered that Welch be made whole. Both
the respondent and Welch appealed. Welch wanted reinstatement; the com-
pany objected to the make whole remedies. The ARB on March 31, 2006,
decided that the reinstatement order of February 2005 was in effect. Cardi-
nal was given leave to appeal to the ARB to stay the effect of the
preliminary order. This is where the case stands.
Both Welch and his family have had to pay a high price for his whistle-
blowing and the subsequent claim. Welch had trouble finding a job after his
firing and was unemployed until April 2003. His job was abolished in May
2004, and he has been unemployed since then.57 While waiting for the last
52. Id. at 17-18; Deborah Solomon, For Financial Whistle-Blowers, New Shield Is an Imper-
fect One, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2004, at Al.
53. EARLE & MADEK, supra note 39, at 19. There were thirty settlements.
54. 454 F. Supp. 2d 552 (W.D. Va. 2006). Welch's situation was detailed in a front-page
article in the Wall Street Journal. Solomon, supra note 52.
55. 2003 SOX 15 (DOLAug. 1,2003).
56. Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 552 (2006).
57. This is not surprising since companies are reluctant to hire whistleblowers and they are
often pariahs in the industry. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good
and Get Rich: Financial Incentives For Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV.
273, 324 (1992) [hereinafter Callahan & Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich]; Terry Morehead
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decision in his favor, he had to sell his farm and he and his family moved to
a smaller house. He and his wife drained their retirement accounts. And the
issue is not yet settled."' The limited SOX statutory remedies, as discussed
above, cannot make him whole.
The limited success of whistleblowers who attempt to obtain remedies
through the designated government complaint process was foreshadowed by
the experiences of federal government employee whistleblowers. The Civil
Service Reform Act ("CSRA") was passed to give better protection to whis-
tleblowers reporting government wrongdoing. 9 The CSRA designated the
Office of Special Counsel ("OSC") to handle whistleblower complaints and
protect them from retaliation. The OSC was supposed to act as an advocate
that could pursue claims for employees who suffered retaliation. Instead, the
OSC "lost sight of its mission"6' and failed to carry out its mandate. As a
result, retaliation increased, up to ninety percent of employees lost their ap-
62peals, and whistleblowing declined. The CSRA was then amended in 1989
by the Whistleblower Protection Act to strengthen the OSC. The amended
Act required that the head of the OSC be an attorney qualified to carry out
the office's function. Protection for whistleblowers was also increased in
several ways, including easing the burden of proof and allowing employees
to pursue their own claims if the OSC failed to take their claims to the Merit
63Systems Protection Board. However, the amended Act did not allow for
damages nor did it extend the limited statute of limitations. Again, its pro-
tection proved inadequate. Among other signs of failure, only one of the 120
appeals brought by whistleblowers to the Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals-the designated recipient-has been successful since 1984.
64
Further amendments that attempt to make whistleblower protection
more effective for government employees have been passed by the House
61
Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They Working?, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 241, 262
n. 102 (1987) [hereinafter Dworkin & Near, Whistleblowing Statutes].
58. Solomon, supra note 52.
59. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2000).
60. 5 U.S.C. § 1206 (1988) (repealed 1989). The OSC is also charged with investigating and
pursuing reports of wrongdoing, and remedying it. Id.
61. Rhonda McMillion, Aiding Whistle-Blowers, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1989, at 121, 121 (quoting
Rep. Patricia Schroeder).
62. See Thomas M. Devine & Donald G. Aplin, Abuse ofAuthority: The Office of the Special
Counsel and Whistleblower Protection, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 5, 25-26 (1986).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 1221 (2000).
64. Press Release, Gov't Accountability Project, Senate Approves Whistleblower Rights
Breakthrough (June 23, 2006). The Government Accountability Project ("GAP") stated that the
court had effectively gutted protection for whistleblowers by refusing to protect them. See id.
65. Included in the House measure is broadening the definition of retaliation to prohibit
punitive denial of security clearance, retaliatory investigations, and gag orders. It would also bar the
President from ex post facto reclassifying an employee as an "intelligence employee" and thereby
restricting their merit system protection rights after they have filed suit. It would restore the reason-
able belief standard for protected reporting and extend coverage to national security employees and
government contractors. Whistleblowers could disclose classified information to members of Con-
gress on relevant oversight committees or to their staff. Federal Employee Protection of Disclosures
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and Senate,66 but as of this writing, they are not yet law. Among the re-
forms is a measure that would give the Office of Special Counsel greater
authority to seek disciplinary measures against managers who retaliate. If
these reforms become law, government whistleblowers could have jury trials
and jurisdiction would be restored to all circuit courts. Currently the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals, and this court has
found for the whistleblower only once in over 100 cases since 1999.68
A different but potentially serious problem for employees seeking re-
dress for retaliation is the use of arbitration agreements as a bar to suit. At
least one court in a SOX case has so held. The court in Boss v. Salomon
Smith Barney, Inc.69 limited the plaintiff's rights by refusing to let him take
his claim to the court because he had signed mandatory arbitration agree-
70
ments when he was hired. Since an increasing number of employers are
requiring employees to sign such agreements, a significant number of em-
ployees could be denied meaningful SOX remedies.7
If over two decades of attempts to make protection effective for govern-
ment employee whistleblowers have proven unsuccessful-especially given
the existence of an official agency that is designed to act as advocate and
protector for whistleblowers-it is highly unlikely that mere adjustments to
the current SOX scheme, as proposed by some scholars, are likely to be suc-
cessful. A more radical change is needed to create effective protection.
Act, H.R. 1317, 109th Cong. (2005); Executive Branch Reform Act of 2006, H.R. 5112, 109th
Cong. (2006).
66. Senate bill 494 was passed as an amendment to the 2007 National Defense Authorization
Act, 96-0 on June 22, 2006. The Senate bill was passed to overturn the Supreme Court decision of
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). This decision narrowed the First Amendment speech
protection for federal workers in whistleblowing cases, and reflects the appointment of a more con-
servative justice to the Court. The case was reargued before the Court after Justice O'Connor, who
had written a prior decision protecting a government employee whistleblower, was replaced by
Justice Alito. The Garcetti Court refused to protect the prosecutor who wrote a memo asking
whether a sheriff's deputy had lied in an affidavit to get a search warrant, finding that when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens and thus are not constitutionally protected from employer sanctions. It further noted that
there are whistleblower protection laws (such as the Whistleblower Protection Act) that the plaintiff
could have used. Id. at 1962. The decision was 5-4. The dissent pointed out that this was likely to
silence whistleblowers. Id. at 1954.
67. They are awaiting conference committee reconciliation.
68. According to GAP, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has effectively gutted protection
for whistleblowers by refusing to protect them. Since 1994, the court has only found for one em-
ployee on appeal versus 119 against. Press Release, Gov't Accountability Project, supra note 64.
69. 263 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
70. The court held that if Congress intended to override arbitration agreements, it must show
that intent in the statute or its legislative history. Id. at 685.
71. Earle & Madek argue that the arbitration process will put the interests of the whistle-
blower and the retaliating employer on the same footing, thus undermining the intent of SOX to give
more importance to the rights of whistleblowers. EARLE & MADEK, supra note 39, at 35. Preference
for whistleblower rights will better carry out the public policy behind SOX.
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B. Failure in Spurring Whistleblowing
As a result of the over thirty years of social science research on whistle-
blowing, it is possible to realistically estimate that SOX's effectiveness will
also be limited in terms of getting observers of wrongdoing to come for-
ward.
There are two main models of legislation designed to encourage whis-
tleblowing. The oldest, and least effective, is based on protecting the
whistleblower from retaliation. The later model gives incentives to encour-
age whistleblowing in addition to offering protection.
1. Protective Whistleblower Legislative Model
The model established by the first state and federal statutes to encourage
whistleblowing is based on a rational but faulty premise. The model as-
sumes that most observers of wrongdoing are people of conscience who
would report the wrongdoing absent the fear of retaliation." Therefore the
statutes ban retaliation in an effort to rid the employees of their fear.73 Stud-
ies of these statutes show that they are ineffective in spurring reporting.74
Additionally, studies of whistleblower motivation showed fear of retaliation
was less important than many other factors in determining whether observ-
ers of wrongdoing would come forward to report it.75 More important in
spurring whistleblowers were serious wrongdoing (either dangerous or in-
volving large sums), strong evidence, the perceived likelihood that the
wrongdoing would be corrected, an organizational atmosphere of openness
that encouraged voice, and clear reporting channels.76
SOX's whistleblowing scheme is based on this protective legislative
model. As such, it is unlikely to spur whistleblowing. This is especially true
if the wrongdoing involves those high in the organization, as occurred in
Enron and WorldCom. Involvement of upper management means that the
organization is less likely to respond and encourage voice, and people will
be less likely to come forward.77 In addition, imposing criminal penalties is
unlikely to deter retaliation by those already engaged in wrongdoing.
72. Dworkin & Near, Whistleblowing Statutes, supra note 57, at 241-247.
73. Id. at 259; Dworkin & Near, Whistleblower Statutes and Reality, supra note 43; Marcia
P. Miceli & Janet P. Near, The Incidence of Wrongdoing, Whistle-Blowing, and Retaliation: Results
of a Naturally Occurring Field Experiment, 2 EMP. RESP. & RTS. J. 91, 92 (1989).
74. Miceli & Near, A Discriminant Analysis, supra note 19, at 698, 700-01.
75. Id.
76. Marcia A. Parmerlee et al., Correlates of Whistle-Blowers'Perceptions of Organizational
Retaliation, 27 ADMIN. ScI. Q. 17, 27-31 (1982); see also David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspec-
tive on Sarbanes Oxley and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1781
(2007); Miceli & Near, A Discriminant Analysis, supra note 19, at 698, 700-01; MICELI & NEAR,
supra note 15, at 136-78. N.B.: "Voice" is a term of art that means more than just voicing concerns.
77. Callahan & Dworkin, Media Whistleblowers, supra note 14, at 165-66.
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2. Incentive Legislation
In enacting SOX, Congress ignored the overwhelming evidence that
merely protecting whistleblowers from retaliation or giving them a cause of
action is unlikely to spur whistleblowing. It also ignored the evidence that
significant rewards are an effective spur. Indeed, they have been so effective
that almost one-third of the states have now adopted reward systems. The
model for this approach is not new; it was established in 1863 and was
based on earlier English laws.78
The federal False Claims Act ("FCA"), 79 enacted in 1863 in response to
contractors cheating the government, was significantly revised in 1986 to
make monetary recoveries for whistleblowers easier and more generous and
thereby to encourage more whistleblowing in the area of government con-
tractor fraud.s Under the Act, the whistleblower (called a relator) files a qui
tam suit with the Department of Justice ("DOJ") on behalf of the U.S. gov-
ernment. If the information is novel and the false claims are proved, the
whistleblower receives up to thirty percent of the judgment if the DOJ does
not join in the prosecution of the suit, and up to twenty-five percent if it
does.8" Since fraud under government contracts tends to be significant ($100
billion per year or more), and individual suits can involve millions of dol-
lars, the FCA has proved to be the most significant piece of legislation for
• • 82
spurring whistleblowing. It is much more effective than merely protecting
the whistleblower from retaliation or even giving the whistleblower a private
cause of action for retaliation, which is the approach of most state whistle-
blower legislation. Prior to 1986, there were fewer than six FCA suits
brought per year; now there are hundreds. FCA settlements and judgments
have totaled over $17 billion and virtually all whistleblowers have recovered
a million dollars or more--even though the majority of suits are settled. 3
The first wave of suits tended to involve defense contractors; the second
wave, the health care industry.8 The next wave may end up involving fraud
78. Id. at 155.
79. The FCA is also referred to as the Lincoln Law. Jon Gibeaut, Seeking the Cure, A.B.A.
J., Oct. 2006, at 44.
80. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988).
81. § 3730 (d)(1)-(2).
82. During the 2006 federal government fiscal year, $3.1 billion was recovered in settle-
ments; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Record $3.1 Billion in
Fraud and' False Claims in Fiscal Year 2006 (Nov. 21, 2006), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/November/06_civ_783.html; and in 2002 $1.1 billion was recovered in
qui tam actions. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $1 Billion
in FY 2002, U.S Department of Justice (Dec. 16, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2002/December/02sciv_720.htm [hereinafter 2002 DOJ Press Release].
83. Of the $1.1 billion recovered in qui tam suits in 2002, $160 million went to the whistle-
blowers bringing the claim. 2002 DOJ Press Release, supra note 82.
84. In the past few years, the drug industry has been the largest single sector for healthcare
fraud. From 2002-2003, the government recovered $1.98 billion; of that, $1.33 billion was from the
pharmaceutical sector. Drug Firms Face Whistleblower Worries, Increased Fraud Recoveries, Attor-
neys Say, 74 U.S. L. Wk. (BNA) 2461 (Feb. 7, 2006).
1769June 20071
Michigan Law Review
related to the Iraqi war and Hurricane Katrina. New entities, such as univer-
sities, are also being sued under the law."
As of 2006, sixteen states and the District of Columbia, seeing the size
and success of recoveries under the federal law and in light of shrinking
funds and expanding budgets, have enacted false claims laws that are similar
to, and in some respects broader than the federal law. California8 6 and Flor-
ida87 were the first to pass false claims acts and, as with the federal law,
these statutes have resulted in significant recoveries. Some of the state laws
apply only to Medicaid fraud; others are general fraud statutes.
Like the federal law, the state statutes provide for a range of recovery,
with the judge determining how much the whistleblower should receive.
Illinois' distribution system is unique. Its law specifies that one-sixth of the
recovery goes to the attorney general, one-sixth to the Department of State
Police, and two-thirds to the qui tam plaintiff.88 The District of Columbia is
the most generous; up to forty percent of the recovery can go to the relator.8 9
Factors the courts consider in determining the amount include how substan-
tially the relator contributed to the case, whether the case primarily
depended on disclosures from other sources,90 and whether the relator
planned, initiated, and/or participated in the wrongdoing.9'
Recent legislation shows that Congress is now aware of the effectiveness
of incentive legislation. The 2006 Deficit Reduction Act contains a section
designed to combat Medicaid fraud and recover federal funds through en-
92
couraging states to pass targeted false claims acts. Congress is particularly
interested in encouraging whistleblowing in this area since the federal gov-
ernment pays 60% of Medicaid, and Medicaid fraud far outpaces other
federal funds fraud.93 The federal government expects to spend $192 billion
on Medicaid in fiscal year 2006. 9 The states should be interested because,
85. See, e.g., Jeffrey Selingo, Expansion of Reasons for Whistle-Blower Lawsuits Should
Worry Colleges, Lawyers' Group Is Told, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 28, 2006; Anne K. Walters,
U.S. Supreme Court Lets Ruling in Whistle-Blower Case Stand, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 28,
2006, at A33.
86. See CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 12650-12656 (West 2005).
87. See FLA. STAT. §§ 68.081-.092 (2005).
88. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 175/8 (2004).
89. D.C. Code § 2-308.15(f)(2) (2001).
90. In this case, the relator cannot recover more than ten percent. § 2-308.15(f)(1).
91. Letter from Laurie E. Ekstrand, Dir., Homeland Sec. & Justice, U.S. Gov't Account.
Office, to The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives et al. (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06320r.pdf.
92. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a (2006).
93. Health care fraud is the number one drain on state and federal treasuries. Gibeaut, supra
note 79, at 46-47. It is by far the main target of current federal qui tam actions and represents 46%
of the 2,490 claims filed from 1987 to 2005 (compared to 33% for procurement fraud). Id. Likewise,
recoveries in medical fraud cases by relators have been much larger ($842 million versus $291
million in procurement fraud), as have government recoveries ($5 billion versus $1.4 billion). Id. In
a recent case involving Swiss pharmaceutical company Serano, five whistleblowers will split $51.8
million. Id.
94. Id. at 48.
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beside the usual FCA state recovery of their 40% of Medicaid funds plus
fines, if the state law follows the federal model, the states can recover an
additional 10%.9' A more unique section of the Deficit Reduction Act is the
requirement that health care providers give employees education programs
96
on fraud and how to file false claims complaints. When this law becomes
effective in January 2007, it is expected to spur some states to pass false
claims acts.97
Congress is also looking at rewards to help recover unpaid taxes. The In-
ternal Revenue Service ("IRS"), at the urging of Congress, is in the process
of revising its reward system to make it more effective.98 The IRS estimates
that the "tax gap"-the difference between what is paid in taxes and the es-
timate of what taxpayers actually owe-is about $290 billion annually.99 The
IRS has long had a rewards system but at present rewards are seldom given,
are long-delayed, and are given at the discretion of the IRS. Some of the
suggested reforms are similar to the 1986 amendments to the FCA, which
made it much more effective. These include making awards more certain
and faster and giving the whistleblower more information and participation
in the process.' °°
A different federal approach that encourages whistleblowing through in-
centives is the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines."" Unlike the FCA, though,
it has not been particularly successful in spurring effective whistleblowing.
The Guidelines encourage organizations to establish a whistleblowing pro-
cedure that is well-publicized, monitored, and under which complaints are
acted on without retaliation to the whistleblower.0 2 Compliance results in
reduced fines and penalties if the organization is convicted of a crime. Fail-
ure to follow these procedures can result in increased sanctions that include
large fines, corporate probation, and mandated negative publicity if the or-
ganization is convicted of federal crimes.'0 3 Hotlines were specifically
95. See id. at 46. Even though states can currently share in Medicaid recoveries, the state can
get increases through triple damages, too, if they pass the law. Id. The HHS issued guidelines in
August regarding state compliance with the federal law. Id. at 49. Among other things, the state law
must allow the case to go forward even if the state decides not to join, whether it allows sealed com-
plaints, and the HHS recommends that the relator should get at least fifteen percent of a recovery.
Id.
96. Id. at 50. Some have complained that the education program undermines stricter com-
pany rules and the new Sarbanes-Oxley financial controls. See id.
97. See id. at 48. Senator Grassley, Senate Finance Committee Chairman and leading spon-
sor of the legislation, stated, "It ought to be black and white as far as state legislators are concerned.
If you are a forward-looking state legislator, you should have passed this years ago, instead of wait-
ing for an incentive from the federal government." Id. at 47. The federal legislation was passed after
the filing deadline for bills in many states. Id. at 48.
98. Tom Herman, IRS Reworks Its Whistle-Blower Program, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2006, at
Dl.
99. Id. This is based on 2001 data.
100. See Callahan & Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich, supra note 57, at 296-301.
101. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (1991).
102. Callahan & Dworkin, State Whistleblower Protection, supra note 2, at 103.
103. Id.
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mentioned as an appropriate whistleblowing procedure, and many compa-
nies started using them as a result of this law.'"
Perhaps because of the Guidelines, hotlines have become the dominant
mechanism for anonymous SOX whistleblowing.' 5 Congress' reliance on
anonymity is again based on a faulty premise; fear of retaliation is not
dominant in preventing observers of wrongdoing from coming forward.
Thus, hotlines are unlikely to spur whistleblowing, 1°6 but they greatly in-
crease costs in time and money for organizations.
There are several national companies running hotlines. However, these
companies describe information about their operations as trade secrets and it
is thus difficult to determine their effectiveness. What information is avail-
able shows that hotlines and other designated recipients of whistleblowing
find that a large percentage of the reports involve human resource issues,
and very few involve legal or ethical issues. '°7 In order to avoid this problem,
some companies limit the topics for which the hotline is to be used.'08 The
large number of non-legal reports raises the question of whether all reports
should be submitted to the audit committee, or whether reports should be
filtered so that only the most important are submitted. The latter course of
action raises the possibility that management might be able to block a matter
that needed to be forwarded, or that a seemingly minor complaint does not
reach the committee and later blows up into a full-scale problem.
Other drawbacks to attempts at facilitating anonymous whistleblowing
are that anonymity makes follow-up more difficult and anonymity is often
difficult to maintain in light of who has access to the information about
wrongdoing.'9 Further, many employees don't trust that their reports will
remain confidential and therefore don't use the hotline. " ° The inevitable
delay caused by reporting outside the organization means that follow-up is
delayed, and that evidence may be lost."I One hotline provider reports that
even though callers are urged to call back in a few weeks to see if there are
104. Id.
105. Companies offering hotlines have expanded greatly since SOX. There are now at least
thirty-five companies offering such services. Meg Green, How's my accounting?, BEST'S REV., Jan.
1, 2004, at 66.
106. One prominent hotline company reports that calls to its hotline have gone down from
seventy-five percent to forty-eight percent over the past twenty years as employees become more
comfortable with reporting. Tim Reason, Whistle-blowers: The Untouchables, CFO, Mar. 2003, at
18.
107. See, e.g., Handling the Nuts and Bolts of SOX Compliance, TEXAS LAWYER, Feb. 7,
2005, at 9.
108. See Bjorhus, supra note 22.
109. Donald V. Jernberg, Whistle-blower hot lines carry own risks, Bus. INS., June 30, 2003,
at 10. The author argues that since companies don't warn employees that anonymity cannot be guar-
anteed, they may face even broader liability than they would from the retaliation claim itself.
110. Project: Corporate Counsel-Legal Service Providers: Successful Implementation Of An
Ethics And Compliance Training System, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL (N.E. ed.), Jan. 2005, at 33.
Ill. Jenberg, supra note 109.
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additional questions, only about thirty percent do."2 Because of these prob-
lems, many experts recommend that hotlines only be used in conjunction
with other in-house procedures such as ombudspersons and internet report-
ing.
HI. EFFECTIVE SOX WHISTLEBLOWING
Congress clearly intended whistleblowing to be an important enforce-
ment part of SOX. However, it adopted flawed mechanisms to encourage
and protect it. SOX should be reformed to implement a reward system simi-
lar to that in the FCA. Observers of wrongdoing should be allowed to bring
a sealed claim to court, and if the information is novel and leads to a suc-
cessful case, the reporter should receive a significant reward.
One source of a reward for SOX whistleblowing, and the easiest, could
be a "fee to play" imposed on all companies who list on the exchanges.
While it would not be significant for any one company, it could create a suf-
ficient fund, especially if increased by a percentage of recovered fines, "3 to
adequately reward whistleblowers for the risks taken in providing the infor-
mation. However, costs associated with SOX are already cited as one of the
main problems with the law, so this fee may not garner adequate support.1
Since the wrongdoing involves fraud or other falsifications, the reward
could be based on a percentage of the fraud amount (trebled) plus fines
similar to the formula used in the FCA." 5 The FCA also has a provision for
a fine of up to $10,000 for each violation. A potential problem with this
plan is that it is subject to standing challenges because government funds
are not usually involved, unlike FCA claims."7 While it is not clear that
these challenges would be successful, the issue could be overcome if Con-
gress passed incentive legislation encouraging the states to include securities
fraud in their false claims statutes similar to the Deficit Reduction Act dis-
cussed above. State entities commonly invest in securities through workers'
112. Green, supra note 105.
113. California recently reformed its law to better protect "shareholders, investors, employees
and the general public" by encouraging whistleblowing in SOX-type situations. As part of better
protection for whistleblowers, the legislators established a fine of up to $10,000 for employers who
violate the statute. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
114. Aaron Lucchetti & Carrick Mollenkamp, Moving the Market: New York to Study Lack of
IPOs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2006, at C3; see also, e.g., Kara Scannell & Deborah Solomon, Busi-
ness Wins Its Battle to Ease A Costly Sarbanes-Oxley Rule, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2006, at Al.
115. Professor Pamela Bucy proposed a "Private Justice Cause of Action" in order to protect
financial markets. It is similar to the FCA and proposes treble damages of the fraud damages
caused. The claim would be brought for the government and the individual bringing it. This is true
despite the fact that the government has not been injured by the fraud. Pamela H. Bucy, Private
Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 105-27 (2002-2003). Rapp, supra note 6, at 46-48 (criticizing Bucy's
proposal as subject to constitutional challenge).
116. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(2000).
117. But see Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article IIl, 91 MicH. L. REV. 163, 232 (1992) (arguing the government can choose to give bounties
to help enforce any law).
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compensation and pension funds, among other investments, so they would
have standing. However, the state would have to argue that the fraudulently
induced price for the stock is a claim encompassed by the law."'
Professor Geoffrey Rapp has proposed a different and innovative way to
fund SOX whistleblower awards. He suggests amending the Fair Fund pro-
visions of SOX so that the whistleblower is given adequate compensation to
make the whistleblowing worth the psychological, emotional, and economic
risk.' 9 The SEC currently has limited power to give rewards but seldom
does so and they are often small.' 20 This situation is similar to the IRS
scheme that is being revised because of its failed incentives. In order to be
most effective, a minimum percentage should be guaranteed to the whistle-
blower bringing new and useful information.
There is a potential drawback, though, to any scheme that rewards whis-
tleblowing: it would be inconsistent with most foreign whistleblowing
legislation. Other countries do not approve of large monetary awards for
whistleblowing. ' This can be cured by providing an exemption for compa-
nies operating in countries that have adequate whistleblower schemes and
• 22
employee protections. There are already many SOX exemptions for for-
eign companies, and U.S. courts seem to be moving to limit the
international reach of SOX's whistleblowing sections.
A. The Foreign Reach of Sarbanes Oxley
While SOX was passed in response to domestic issues, it was written
badly and in haste, which, among other things, allowed for potential extra-I. • 123
territorial application. The ramifications of the economic and political
effects of extraterritorial application lacked adequate consideration. This is
true of Section 806, the primary whistleblowing section. This section is
broadly written and makes virtually no distinction between domestic and
foreign companies that have securities registered or listed in the United
States. It has the potential to reach foreign companies and may encompass
U.S. employees working abroad. So far there are few judgments on the ex-
traterritorial reach of SOX.
118. See Rapp, supra note 6, at 44.
119. Id. at 49-50.
120. Id. at 4. Rapp suggests this could be done administratively. Id. at 49.
121. See Callahan et al., supra note 16, at 897-98.
122. The European Commission has proposed its own version of business ethical standards,
the Action Plan, as a reaction to SOX. It is seen as a "more multi-dimensional approach, placing
shareholder interest as one of a group of protected interests." Robert Y. Roberts et al., Spilt milk:
Parmalat and Sarbanes-Oxley internal controls reporting, I INT'L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE
215, 223 (2004). The International Financial Reporting Standards are also in place for virtually all
listed European companies. Thomas Wardell et al., The convergence of governance, WORLD FIN.,
Sept.-Oct. 2005, available at http://www.mckennalong.con/attachment/298/WF_06-0 1.pdf.
123. Roberts et al., supra note 122, at 218; see also Detlev F Vagts, Extraterritoriality and the
Corporate Governance Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 289, 289 (2003).
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In the first important appellate decision regarding whistleblowing and
extraterritorial application of SOX, in January 2006 the First Circuit found
that Sarbanes-Oxley did not protect a foreign worker who reported account-
ing irregularities at a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corporation.'2 4 Boston
Scientific Corporation ("BSC"), a Delaware corporation, fired Carnero, an
Argentinean citizen working in Brazil for a BSC subsidiary, allegedly for
reporting that BSC's Argentinean and Brazilian subsidiaries were improp-
erly inflating sales figures.' 21 In addition to seeking statutory termination
pay in Argentina, Camero filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of
Labor ("DOL") seeking relief under SOX.' 26 The DOL issued a preliminary
decision dismissing his claim, finding that SOX does not apply to employ-
ees of covered companies working outside of the United States.117 Camero
then filed a complaint with the district court, seeking de novo review. The
district court also found no extraterritorial application under these circum-
stances.
2 8
The First Circuit found that Carnero's allegations likely fit within SOX's
whistleblower protection section,' 29 assuming without deciding that he was
an "employee" as defined by the Act, and that his employment was termi-
nated in retaliation for protected conduct."" However, it also found that the
law did not have extraterritorial coverage under Camero's circumstances.
3
1
The court concluded that pertinent factors would not support a finding of
congressional intent in order to overcome a presumption against extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. laws.132 The court described the policy behind the
presumption as preventing unintended conflicts between U.S. laws and
those of other countries. 133 It stated that Congress is "primarily concerned
with domestic conditions." '3 This statement denies the reality that over a
thousand foreign companies list their securities in the United States and vol-
untarily subject themselves to U.S. laws, and that Congress was assumedly
124. Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp. (Carnero II), 433 F.3d 1,9 (1 st Cir. 2006).
125. Id. at 2-3.
126. Id. at 3.
127. Id. After the DOL decision, Carnero filed a complaint in federal district court, Camero v.
Boston Scientific Corp., No. Civ.A.04-10031-RWZ, 2004 WL 1922132 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2004),
and also filed a state court claim for breach of contract and retaliatory termination, among others.
The district court dismissed the state law claim because Camero had no contact with Boston Scien-
tific in Massachusetts nor did Boston Scientific direct or control his employment in Latin America.
Camero 11, 433 E3d at 4. This decision was upheld by the First Circuit. Id. at 2.
128. Camero, 2004WL 1922132.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. 2002).
130. Camero 11, 433 F.3d at 6.
131. Id. at 18.
132. Id. at 8, 18.
133. Id. at 7.
134. Id. (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991)).
June 2007] 1775
Michigan Law Review
aware of this globalization of the securities market when it enacted SOX. 35
The court found unpersuasive Carnero's argument that to exempt him from
protection would frustrate the basic purpose of SOX which is to protect in-
vestors in U.S. securities markets as well as the integrity of the markets.
While this "theoretical" protection of investors might be important, it was
trumped by the lack of evidence that Congress intended the statute to have
extraterritorial effect.136 The court contrasted the section under which
Carnero was seeking relief with another whistleblowing provision of
SOX, 3 7 Section 1107, which it stated showed clear congressional intent to
apply extraterritorially. 138
Senator Leahy, in discussing SOX, stated that "[t]he law was intention-
ally written to sweep broadly, protecting any employee of a publicly traded
company who took such reasonable action to try to protect investors and the
market."' 3 9 The Carnero court found that Leahy's concern was with the lack
of protection under state law and that he did not mean that Section 806
should have extraterritorial application.
There have been only a handful of subsequent decisions involving this
issue. In In re Concone v. Capital One Financial Corp.4 the administrative
law judge, citing Carnero, found that the complainant, an Italian citizen
working only in Italy and England, was not a covered employee under SOX
because he was employed outside the United States. In dicta, the judge
stated that he saw no reason why SOX would not apply to foreign nationals
working in the United States, stating that Carnero turned on the fact that
Camero was employed outside the United States and not on his citizen-
ship.
143
135. The court noted that more than a thousand foreign companies were registered and report-
ing with the SEC as of Dec. 31, 2003. Id. at 5-6. However, it also later said that there was nothing in
the legislative history of SOX that indicated that Congress gave any consideration to either the pos-
sibility or the problems of overseas application. Id at 8.
136. See id. at 7 ("[Tlhe presumption can be overcome only if there is an 'affirmative inten-
tion of the Congress clearly expressed."' (quoting Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 248)).
137. Id. at 8. The court found that section 301, which requires audit committees to implement
procedures to facilitate anonymous whistleblowing, was not applicable because it conferred no
enforceable rights on employees. Id. at 10.
138. Id. ("That Congress provided for extraterritorial reach as to Section 1107 but did not do
so as to Section 806 (the provision relevant here) conveys the implication that Congress did not
mean Section 806 to have extraterritorial effect."). Congress expressly provided for extraterritorial
jurisdiction with respect to the provision that Section 1107 amended. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 1513(d) (2000) ("There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this sec-
tion.")).
139. 149 CoNo. REc. S1725 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Senator
Leahy said that he had unique insight because he helped craft the part protecting whistleblowers and
worked to get it into SOX on the Senate floor. Id.
140. Carnero , 433 F3d at 11-12.
141. No. 2005-SOX-00006 (ALJ) (Dep't of Labor Dec. 3,2004).
142. Id. at 2-3, 6.
143. Id. at 4, n.4.
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In another case involving SOX and potential foreign application,
Penesso v. LLC International, Inc.,'" the administrative law judge found that
a U.S. citizen working abroad could bring a claim under SOX.1'4 The plain-
tiff's claim withstood summary judgment, the judge having found that
Carnero was not controlling on the issue of extraterritoriality because
Penesso was a U.S. citizen working abroad and some of the actions he com-
plained of took place in the United States.'4
Despite good policy arguments and sufficiently broad language in SOX
to encompass cases such as Canero, consistently limiting the reach of the
Section 806 to the United States would help alleviate some of the fears of
other countries such as Germany and France. Such countries see the U.S.
policy as too broad and believe that confidential transmission of information
is preferable to anonymity. 47 The other countries prefer a paper trail so that
information can be confirmed, ultimately so that no one can be condemned
nor have their reputation sullied without certainty as to the accuracy of the
information. 4 In 2005, French and German regulators refused to approve
whistleblower mechanisms that McDonald's Corporation and CEAC/Exide
(in France) and Wal-Mart (in Germany) sought. These mechanisms would
have made the policies in France and Germany coincide with U.S. SOX
whistleblower protections. 49 Other European countries joined the debate
about these privacy concerns when an E.U. committee composed of privacy
experts from the member states proposed on February 1, 2006 a non-binding
resolution providing that U.S.-listed companies would have to negotiate
such provisions separately with each country. 5° This, of course, would have
created tremendous compliance headaches for companies.
B. Exemptions
Several countries have reacted strongly against the external application
of SOX. 5' While most agree with the tenor of the Act (trying to ensure ethi-
cal behavior in business and strengthen the integrity of the markets),"' they
144. No. 2005-SOX-00016 (ALJ) (Dep't of Labor Mar.4, 2005).
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id.
147. Among other reasons, they object to SOX whistleblowing policies because they find
them reminiscent of Nazism and World War H. See John Gibeaut, Culture Clash: Other Countries
Don't Embrace Sarbanes or America's Reverence of Whistle-Blowers, A.B.A. J., May 2006, at 10
[hereinafter Gibeaut, Culture Clash]. They also place motive above information, and are more dis-
trustful of whistleblower motives. See Callahan et al., supra note 16, at 895-96.
148. See Gibeaut, Culture Clash, supra note 147, at 12.
149. Id. at 10.
150. Id.
151. The Chinese, for example, have consistently cited the fear of class-action securities law-
suits for deciding to issue stocks abroad; the Europeans the cost of compliance. Murray, supra note
9.
152. The stated purpose of the Act is to "restore investor confidence by improving corporate
financial reporting." BOSTELMAN, supra note 5, at 2-37.
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do not necessarily perceive the United States to be at the pinnacle of busi-
ness acumen nor that U.S. policies should supersede the policies of
individual countries, many of which already have corporate governance
policies. '53
The SEC has long made accommodations to facilitate foreign listings on
the NYSE and NASDQ. Perceived benefits of foreign listings include better
investor protection under U.S. law, access to capital and increased prestige
for the foreign firm, and more income for the exchange.) In 1979, the SEC
began allowing foreign stock issuers to file some forms and exempted them
from some sections relating to proxy rules, tender offer rules, and short
swing profit rules to facilitate foreign listings.5 5 Later accommodations in-
cluded the filing of different forms and different disclosure standards. In
addition, the SEC has used informal procedures including the confidential
treatment of filings and certain disclosures exemptions, and corporate gov-
ernance issues have tended to be left to the home jurisdictions. ' As a result,
there was a surge of foreign filings in the last decade. The growth was both
in numbers, and in countries and areas represented.
The growth has seen a reversal since 2000. Some commentators blame
over-regulation,' and some particularly cite the cost of SOX compliance for
this reduction. At the same time, other exchanges, particularly European, are
increasingly an attractive alternative. 1 8 The SEC has acknowledged the im-
portance of the globalization of the securities market and the concerns of
foreign issuers," 9 and has created exemptions to deal with some of these
concerns.
153. Roberts et al., supra note 123, at 218.
154. A fee is required to list on both the NYSE and NASDAQ. E.g., NASDAQ, Listing Stan-
dards & Fees (Dec. 2006), http://www.nasdaq.comabout/nasdaqlisting__req-fees.pdf (last visited
Jan. 31, 2007).
155. 17 C.ER. §§ 249.220f, 240.3a12-3(b), 239.31 to 34; Greg Ip, Is a U.S. Listing Worth the
Effort?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006, at C1; Christopher Woo, The Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
on Foreign Private Issuers 11 (2007) (on file with author).
156. Woo, supra note 155, at 11-12.
157. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88
CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000); Kara Scannell, Democrat Nods to Wall Street-Rep. Frank Is Flexible on
Sarbanes-Oxley, Tougher on CEO Pay, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2006, at A4; Woo, supra note 155, at 2;
see also authorities cited supra notes 8 & 9.
158. Norma Cohen & John Authers, Euronext seeks rules protection, FIN. TIMES, June 28,
2006, at 23 ("Euronext is considering creating a special trust to own the licenses of its European
exchanges, in a bid to protect itself against any potential move by US regulators to extend their
reach across the Atlantic.... [I]ssuers and regulators have expressed concern that the provisions of
the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation-blamed for the sharp drop in international listings on the NYSE-
would be exported to Europe"). Some of these concerns may become moot if the attempted and
predicted mergers of exchanges take place. See Aaron Lucchetti & Edward Taylor, NYSE May Ask
Deutsche Boerse to Join Euronext Deal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2006, at C5; Laura Santini, et al.,
Merger Frenzy Among Exchanges Could Be Making Its Way to Asia, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2006, at
B3.
159. See Woo, supra note 155, at 16 (citing the comments of Commissioner Paul Atkins).
160. See, e.g., Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229,
244, 249 (2006).
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For example, the E.U. countries were particularly concerned with Sec-
tion 103 and the audit committee requirements which they felt conflicted
with their own rules. After intense negotiations, an exemption was created
for foreign issuers who have an adequate alternative structure that includes
the following: a board of auditors that is separate and distinct from the board
of directors; no company executive director on the board of auditors; a
board of directors that does not appoint the board of auditors; and the coun-
try's laws must provide adequate independence of management from the
board of auditors. 16 Likewise, Section 106, which deals with foreign ac-
counting firms, creates exceptions "tailored to difficulties inherent in U.S.
regulation of overseas professionals.'
' 62
The conflict between whistleblower and confidentiality laws has not
been resolved, although it is under discussion between U.S. and European
representatives. 6 1 If there are blanket exemptions that significantly affect
disclosure and transparency, they will undermine some of the advantages of
listing on the U.S exchanges. As noted by Senator Leahy, "[w]hen sophisti-
cated corporations set up complex fraud schemes, corporate insiders are
often the only ones who can disclose what happened and why.
' 64
CONCLUSION
Whistleblowing is gaining recognition worldwide as an important means
of ensuring the transparency and integrity of global markets.6 6 The contribu-
tion of insiders with information about wrongdoing that would be hard to
otherwise obtain is growing in importance as organizations become more
complex and disparate. Congress recognized whistleblowing's importance
by making encouragement of whistleblowing and protecting whistleblowers
an integral part of Sarbanes-Oxley. Congress should now take the next step to
make the law more effective by creating a reward system similar to that under
the False Claims Act. The reward incentive is the only scheme in the United
States that has proved effective in encouraging enforcement through whistle-
blowing. The risk of abuse through class action derivative suits is reduced by
161. See Maria Camilla Cardilli, Regulation Without Borders: The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley
on European Companies, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 785, 801-02 (2004).
162. Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 7216(c) (Supp. I1 2002) which states that the SEC or the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board may, as it "'determines necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors' exempt the foreign firm from the Act").
163. Gibeaut, supra note 79.
164. 148 CONG. REC. S6439-40 (daily ed. July 9, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
165. See Annette L. Nazareth, Keeping SarbOx Is Crucial: Some U.S. critics call it burden-
some, but other nations are adopting similar laws, Bus. WK., Nov. 13, 2006, at 134; see also Ip,
supra note 155.
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requiring that the reward be based on new information, the government re-
view of the claim, and the detailed pleadings that would be involved.6
Additionally, the statute of limitations on bringing claims should be sig-
nificantly expanded in order to give employees adequate time to report.
Further, the legislation should specifically state that fraud claims and retalia-
tion claims trump arbitration clauses.
If these reforms are instituted, limited exemptions from the whistle-
blower sections of SOX should be created for foreign companies who
operate in countries that have their own schemes to protect employees from
retaliation. This will avoid undue conflict with the laws of foreign countries
whose companies are listing on the exchanges. It is possible for the United
States to maintain the integrity of its markets while being a global player.
166. See Rapp, supra note 6, at 9-14. In response to these perceived problems, Congress
passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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